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STORETRAX.COM, INC. V. GURLAND: KEEP TRAX OF YOUR 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
JAMES R. HART III* 
 
In Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals 
considered whether a corporate director breached his fiduciary duty to the 
corporation by filing suit against the corporation, pursuing summary 
judgment by default, and executing the default judgment by garnishing the 
corporation’s bank account, despite the corporation’s obvious ignorance of 
the lawsuit.2  The court held that a director does not breach his fiduciary 
duty by filing suit and enforcing a judgment against the corporation, so long 
as the director makes a full disclosure, giving the corporation fair notice of 
the conflicting personal interest.3  In so holding, the court sounded a wake-
up call to boards of directors to exercise greater caution in their termination 
of potentially disgruntled directors and to be diligent in the selection and 
retention of a qualified and interested resident agent.4 
I.  THE CASE 
Joshua A. Gurland (“Gurland”) founded Storetrax.com, Inc. 
(“Storetrax”) in 1997 and incorporated it as an Internet-based commercial 
real estate listing service in January 1998.5  On October 25, 1999, Gurland 
sold a majority interest in Storetrax’s stock to a group of investors.6  
Gurland retained membership on the board of directors and was named 
President and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the corporation.7  
 
Copyright © 2008 by James R. Hart III. 
* Mr. Hart is a third-year law student at the University of Maryland School of Law where he 
is an Associate Editor for the Maryland Law Review.  Special thanks to James W. Hart, Esq., for 
his unceasing encouragement and advice.  Thanks also to Heather R. Pruger, my Executive Notes 
& Comments Editor, for her tremendous efforts throughout the editing of this article. 
 1. 397 Md. 37, 915 A.2d 991 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 42–43, 915 A.2d at 994. 
 3. Id. at 59, 61, 63, 66–67, 915 A.2d at 1004–06, 1008–09. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. Storetrax.com, 397 Md. at 43, 915 A.2d at 994. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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Gurland entered into an employment agreement, which included a 
termination clause that allowed Storetrax to terminate the agreement, with 
or without cause, at any time, with ten days’ written notice, and entitled him 
to severance pay for termination without cause.8 
Following a series of changes in Storetrax’s senior management, 
during which Gurland surrendered the title of President and was named 
Senior Vice President of Technology and Strategy, Storetrax terminated 
Gurland’s employment in November 2001.9  Shortly thereafter, Gurland 
hired an attorney and attempted to negotiate his severance payment.10  
Gurland continued to serve on the board of directors until December 5, 
2002.11 
Gurland and Storetrax senior management disputed whether Gurland 
was entitled to the severance payment provided by the termination clause in 
Gurland’s employment agreement.12  In January 2002, a member of 
Storetrax’s board made a settlement offer to Gurland, which Gurland agreed 
to consider.13  No further negotiations took place, however, and on January 
21, 2002, Gurland sued Storetrax for breach of contract, asking for 
$150,000 in severance pay due under the termination clause of the parties’ 
employment agreement.14   
Service of process was properly made upon Storetrax’s resident agent 
on February 1, 2002.15  The resident agent, however, failed to deliver the 
summons, complaint, and motion for summary judgment to Storetrax.16  
 
 8. Id. at 43–44, 915 A.2d at 994–95. 
 9. Id. at 43 n.1, 915 A.2d at 994 n.1.  In January 2000, Gurland relinquished the CEO 
position to Robert Rosenfeld, one of the corporation’s investors and co-chair of the board of 
directors.  Id.  In April 2001, the company hired Thomas McCabe to replace Rosenfeld as CEO 
and Gurland as President.  Id.  Gurland was named Senior Vice President of Technology and 
Strategy.  Id.  Shortly thereafter, Elizabeth Stewart replaced McCabe as CEO and President of 
Storetrax, and she terminated Gurland in November 2001.  Id. 
 10. Id. at 44, 915 A.2d at 995. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  While Gurland believed he was entitled to twelve months’ severance pay, the 
Storetrax board responded that he was not entitled to the payment because he was terminated “for 
cause.”  Id. at 45, 915 A.2d at 995.  Storetrax’s board cited several instances where Storetrax 
senior management had questioned Gurland’s job performance.  Id. at 45 n.2, 915 A.2d at 995 n.2.   
 13. Id. at 45, 915 A.2d at 995–96. 
 14. Id., 915 A.2d at 996.   
 15. Id. at 46, 915 A.2d at 996. 
 16. Id.  Storetrax did not receive notice of Gurland’s lawsuit because of several errors made 
by the resident agent and an independent contractor hired by the resident agent to receive and 
forward service of process on the agent’s behalf.  Id. at 46 n.3, 915 A.2d 996 n.3.  Initially, the 
independent contractor could not deliver the papers because it used an out-dated address for 
Storetrax.  Id.  When the papers were returned on February 4, 2002, the independent contractor 
attempted to have the resident agent forward the documents to Storetrax’s correct address.  Id.  
However, the resident agent’s employee responsible for Storetrax’s service of process “walked 
out” on her job around February 4, 2002, and the papers remained on her desk until March 20, 
2002, when they were discovered and immediately mailed to Storetrax’s correct address.  Id. 
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Storetrax then failed to file a timely answer and response to Gurland’s 
complaint and motion for summary judgment.17  On March 8, 2002, the 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland entered a default 
summary judgment against Storetrax for $150,000.18  Gurland petitioned 
the court for a writ of garnishment to attach Storetrax’s bank account, 
which was issued on March 19, 2002.19  Storetrax’s bank garnished the 
account for $150,000 the following day.20   
Although Gurland visited Storetrax’s offices on two separate occasions 
after filing suit, Storetrax did not become aware of the lawsuit until it 
received notice of the attachment of its bank account on March 19, 2002.21  
Immediately thereafter, Storetrax’s counsel wrote a letter to Gurland 
requesting that Gurland set aside his default judgment and withdraw the 
garnishment on Storetrax’s corporate bank account.22  Gurland refused and, 
on April 3, 2002, Storetrax filed motions to set aside the default judgment 
and quash the writ of attachment.23  The circuit court denied both motions 
and Storetrax appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.24   
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, reversed the 
trial court’s judgment and held that the circuit court abused its discretion by 
denying Storetrax’s motion to set aside the default summary judgment.25  
The intermediate appellate court remanded the case to the circuit court and 
Gurland moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the 
company had terminated his employment “for cause.”26  The circuit court 
granted Gurland’s motion and a jury awarded Gurland $150,000 on the 
remaining issues.27   
Storetrax simultaneously noted its appeal from the breach of contract 
judgment and sued Gurland in the circuit court alleging that Gurland, as a 
director, breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation by pursuing his 
claim.28  The court heard the breach of fiduciary duty claim in March 2004, 
 
 17. Id. at 46, 915 A.2d at 996. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 45–46, 915 A.2d at 996. 
 22. Id. at 46–47, 915 A.2d at 996. 
 23. Id. at 47, 915 A.2d at 996. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id., 915 A.2d at 996–97. 
 28. Id. at 47, 915 A.2d at 997.  Specifically, Storetrax alleged that Gurland breached his 
fiduciary duties by, among other things, suing the corporation, obtaining a default judgment when 
he knew the corporation opposed his claims, attaching the corporation’s bank accounts to enforce 
the monetary judgment, and opposing the corporation’s efforts to have that judgment and 
garnishment set aside.  Id. at 47–48, 915 A.2d at 997. 
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and ruled in Gurland’s favor.29  Storetrax appealed the breach of fiduciary 
duty claim and the Court of Special Appeals consolidated this claim with 
Storetrax’s appeal of the breach of contract claim for oral argument.30  On 
March 31, 2006, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s 
grant of partial summary judgment in the breach of contract case, finding 
that there was a triable question as to whether Gurland had been dismissed 
“for cause.”31  The court, however, affirmed the trial court’s determination 
that Gurland had not breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation.32   
Storetrax petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ of 
certiorari.33  The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether 
the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that Gurland did not breach 
his fiduciary duties when he sued the corporation, obtained a default 
summary judgment against the corporation, executed the judgment, and 
opposed the corporation’s attempts to set aside the judgment and 
garnishment.34 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The fiduciary duties that a director owes to a corporation and its 
shareholders are universally well-settled.35  Many courts have further 
clarified that a director does not breach these duties by filing a complaint 
and motion for default summary judgment against the corporation.36  A few 
courts have examined whether a director breaches his fiduciary duty by 
pursuing default summary judgment without the corporation’s actual notice 
of the lawsuit.37  Only a single court has held that a director who obtained a 
judgment against the corporation did not breach his fiduciary duty by 
refusing to accede to the corporation’s demands that he not execute the 
judgment.38 
 
 29. Id. at 48, 915 A.2d at 997. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 168 Md. App. 50, 67, 75, 895 A.2d 355, 365, 370 
(2006). 
 32. Id. at 88, 895 A.2d at 377. 
 33. Storetrax.com, 397 Md. at 48, 915 A.2d at 997. 
 34. Id. at 48–49, 915 A.2d at 997–98. 
 35. See, e.g., infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra Part II.A. 
 37. See infra Part II.B.  Courts are split on what facts and circumstances constitute “actual 
notice.”  See infra Part II.B. 
 38. See infra Part II.C. 
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A.  A Director May Hold an Interest Adverse to the Corporation Only if 
He Does Not Receive an Unfair Advantage as a Result of His 
Insider Position 
Corporate directors owe a corporation and its shareholders an 
unceasing fiduciary duty to act with the utmost due care and loyalty, in 
good faith, and in the best interests of the corporation, as an ordinarily 
prudent person would under similar circumstances.39  Despite this high 
standard, a director may have interests that conflict with the corporation’s 
interests without necessarily breaching his duty to the corporation if those 
interests are fully disclosed to and approved by the corporation.40  A 
director with interests that conflict with the corporation’s may protect 
against breach of his fiduciary duty by giving notice to the corporation and 
fully disclosing his conflicting interests.41 
In 1968, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that directors have a 
duty to reveal to the corporation “all facts material to the corporate 
transactions.”42  In Parish v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers 
Association, several members of the Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers 
Association (the “Association”) sued the Association’s directors for fraud 
and breach of fiduciary duty.43  The Parish court found an actionable claim 
that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty to the Association and 
its members by intentionally distributing false and misleading annual 
reports and recklessly mismanaging the Association’s financial interests.44  
Specifically, the court noted that a director’s sale of corporate assets 
 
 39. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1(a) (LEXISNEXIS 1999); see Booth v. 
Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 436–37 (1881) (stating that directors hold powers that are only “to be 
exercised for the common and general interest of the corporation,” while maintaining a “strict and 
faithful” duty to the corporation and its shareholders); Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 
Md. 598, 605–06 (1875) (stating that directors must exercise their “best efforts to promote the 
interest of the shareholders”); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 
1993) (summarizing the “fundamental principle of Delaware law” that directors of a corporation 
are presumed to act “‘on an informed basis . . . in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interest of the company.’” (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & 
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989))); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 
1256 (Del. Ch. 1980) (stating that the business judgment rule “requires utmost loyalty” from 
directors to the corporation and its interests). 
 40. Cf. Shapiro v. Greenfield, 136 Md. App. 1, 13–15, 764 A.2d 270, 276–77 (2000) 
(discussing interested director transactions). 
 41. MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-419(a)–(b) (LEXISNEXIS 2007). 
 42. Parrish v. Md. & Va. Milk Prod. Ass’n, 250 Md. 24, 74, 242 A.2d 512, 539 (1968), aff’d 
on reh’g, 261 Md. 618, 277 A.2d 19, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). 
 43. Id. at 32, 39, 242 A.2d at 516, 520. 
 44. Id. at 74, 242 A.2d at 540.  For instance, the directors continued to violate federal antitrust 
laws following a federal district court order; falsely reported to the Association’s members a 
capital gain of $450,000, which had in fact been a capital loss; and conspired among themselves to 
withhold vital information from the members of the Association.  Id. at 39–41, 242 A.2d at 520–
21. 
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without notifying the corporation would violate the director’s duty to fully 
disclose all facts material to the corporation.45 
Most recently, in Shapiro v. Greenfield,46 the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals stated that a director could fulfill his statutory fiduciary 
duties by fully disclosing any conflicting interest to the corporation’s 
shareholders or board of directors, thus giving the corporation an 
opportunity to approve the transaction or take other action.47  In Shapiro, 
two minority shareholders of a Maryland corporation sued the corporation’s 
officers and directors, alleging that the officers and directors usurped a 
corporate opportunity and breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation 
and its shareholders by approving an interested director transaction that 
transferred control of the corporation’s shopping center to a limited 
partnership as part of a redevelopment project.48  The Shapiro court 
remanded the case to determine whether the directors were interested and 
had thus violated Section 2-419 of the Maryland Code.49   
B.  Some Jurisdictions Permit Directors to File Suit Against the 
Corporation Only if the Director Notifies the Corporation and 
Does Not Have an Unfair Advantage as the Corporation’s Creditor 
Although, until Storetrax.com, Maryland courts had not addressed the 
extent to which directors could act as adverse parties in legal proceedings 
against the corporations they serve as directors, courts outside of Maryland 
have held that corporate officers and directors are not precluded from filing 
suit against the corporation merely because of their positions as officers or 
directors.50  Underpinning many courts’ scrutiny of a director becoming a 
corporate creditor and enforcing a judgment is the concern that the director-
creditor may have an unfair advantage in obtaining or satisfying the 
 
 45. Id. at 74, 242 A.2d at 540. 
 46. 136 Md. App. 1, 764 A.2d 270 (2000). 
 47. Id. at 14–15, 764 A.2d at 277.  Section 2-419 of the Corporations and Associations Article 
provides that an interested director transaction is not void or voidable merely because of a conflict 
of interest.  MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-419(a)–(b) (LEXISNEXIS 2007).  Instead, as 
the court pointed out, the statute creates a “safe harbor” for certain transactions under the Code.  
Shapiro, 136 Md. App. at 14, 764 A.2d at 277 (citing § 2-419).   
 48. Id. at 4–7, 764 A.2d at 271–73. 
 49. Id. at 24, 764 A.2d at 282.  The court clarified that the transaction itself did not violate the 
corporate opportunity doctrine because the transaction was entered into on behalf of the 
corporation and not on behalf of the individual directors, even though the directors had, or 
potentially had, a direct financial interest in the limited partnership co-development project.  Id. at 
17, 764 A.2d at 278. 
 50. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Phila. & Gulf S.S. Co., 216 F. 795, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (stating 
that “no rule of law or equity . . . prohibits a creditor of a corporation from bringing suit because 
he is also a director”); Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 128–29 (Del. Ch. 1969) 
(holding, in a suit filed by a director against his corporation, that a director has the right to inspect 
the corporation’s books and records). 
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judgment.51  To dispel this unfair advantage, courts frequently require a 
director to give actual notice to a corporation before acting adversely to the 
corporation’s interests.52 
For example, in Marr v. Marr,53 the Court of Errors and Appeals of 
New Jersey held that a director-creditor must give the corporation fair 
notice, as determined by the circumstances, of legal proceedings to collect a 
judgment.54  Applying this subjective test, the court found that, here, the 
director-creditor’s general threat to the other shareholders that he would 
litigate his claims and liquidate the corporation’s assets did not constitute 
fair notice of his legal proceedings.55  Rather, the court stated that the 
director-creditor was obligated to give the corporation specific notice of the 
precise steps he planned to take to imminently liquidate the corporation’s 
assets.56 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Union Ice 
Company of Philadelphia v. Hulton57 that an officer or director who sues a 
corporation must give the corporation adequate notice to enable the 
corporation to take steps to protect its best interests.58  The Union Ice 
president sued his corporation to recover $33,000 that he had loaned to the 
corporation, and then liquidated the corporation’s assets at a sheriff’s sale 
for a nominal price.59  The only notice the corporation received of the 
president’s actions came from the vice president of the corporation, who, 
acting as the president’s personal attorney, told several directors that if the 
president’s debts were not paid, the president would have to execute his 
judgment and sell the company’s assets.60  The court held that this notice 
was “vague and indefinite” and that the directors were entitled to know the 
time and place of the sheriff’s sale so that they could protect the 
corporation’s best interests.61  While a director may enforce a claim against 
his corporation, the court said, he must employ the same methods available 
 
 51. See, e.g., infra notes 57–63 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., infra notes 55–63 and accompanying text. 
 53. 70 A. 375 (1908). 
 54. Id. at 378.  Here, one of the corporation’s directors, William A. Marr, executed a 
judgment against the corporation and liquidated the corporation’s assets at a sheriff’s sale without 
notifying the corporation.  Id. at 376.  Marr brought his action without the knowledge of anyone 
representing the corporation, except perhaps the resident agent who may not have received service 
of process.  Id. at 379.   
 55. Id.  Marr gave the other shareholders this “general notice” at two different shareholders’ 
meetings in 1897 and 1898.  Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 140 A. 514 (Pa. 1928). 
 58. Id. at 514–15.   
 59. Id. at 514. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 514–15 (citing Gilmore v. W. J. Gilmore Drug Co., 123 A. 730 (Pa. 1924)). 
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to other creditors and may not take any unfair advantage of the corporation 
in doing so.62 
Alternatively, one court has found that there is no impermissible unfair 
advantage created when a director acts with “the utmost good faith” and 
there is no evidence of conspiracy to defraud the corporation.  In Beaver 
Park Co. v. Hobson,63 the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the district 
court’s finding that a director did not breach his fiduciary duty to the 
company when he became the company’s creditor by making a personal 
loan to the insolvent corporation following a devastating flood that ruined 
the company’s properties.64  The court reasoned that the director was 
entitled to preferential reimbursement from the corporation because he was 
likely to provide future financial assistance to the distressed corporation.65  
Because the director acted at all times with the “utmost good faith” and 
there was no evidence of any conspiracy to defraud the company, the court 
held that it would be “neither legal nor equitable” to use the director’s 
corporate role to prevent him from recovering his personal investment in 
the company.66 
C.  Under Maryland Law, a Director is Not Legally Obligated to 
Concede to a Corporation’s Request to Not Exercise a Judgment 
Against the Corporation 
Only one court has addressed whether a director or officer may 
exercise a judgment against a corporation despite the corporation’s requests 
to the contrary.  In Waterfall Farm Systems, Inc. v. Craig,67 the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland stated that a director does 
not have “a legal obligation to accede to demands of the Corporation” 
merely because he holds the position of director when the corporation’s 
demands are contrary to the director’s personal financial interests.68  
Waterfall Farm Systems, a closely-held hydroponic69 farming corporation, 
sued two of its directors, Allan and Carol Craig (the “Craigs”), claiming 
that the Craigs breached their duties of loyalty and fair dealing by 
attempting to take over the hydroponic business after evicting the 
corporation and terminating its at-will verbal lease.70  Because the Craigs 
 
 62. Id. at 515 (citations omitted). 
 63. 283 P. 772 (Colo. 1929).   
 64. Id. at 775. 
 65. Id. at 776. 
 66. See id. at 775–76. 
 67. 914 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Md. 1995). 
 68. Id. at 1228.   
 69. Hydroponics involves growing plants without soil.  Id. at 1216. 
 70. Id. at 1228. 
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were the lessors of the corporation’s greenhouse and the principal owners of 
essential equipment in the greenhouse, the court stated that, absent a 
binding lease, the Craigs had the legal right to assume full possession of the 
greenhouse and equipment.71  The court found no unfairness or breach of 
fiduciary duty by the Craigs when they terminated the corporation’s 
tenancy-at-will lease and refused to accede to the corporation’s demands.72 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that Joshua Gurland did not breach his fiduciary duties as a member of 
the corporation’s board of directors by pursuing his severance claims 
against the corporation in court, through and including execution of 
judgment.73  Writing for the majority, Judge Harrell reiterated the well-
settled notion that a director of a corporation has a fiduciary relationship 
with the corporation and its shareholders and must perform his duties in the 
corporation’s best interests, exercising good faith and reasonable care as an 
ordinarily prudent person would under similar circumstances.74  The court 
noted that a director must perform his duties and exercise his powers for the 
collective benefit of the corporation and not for personal gain, although 
situations may arise where a director has interests that diverge from those of 
the corporation on whose board he sits.75  Where such conflicting interests 
exist, the court acknowledged, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a 
corporate officer or director is not precluded from bringing a claim against 
the corporation merely because of his corporate role.76   
Focusing on whether Gurland breached his fiduciary duty by pursuing 
summary judgment by default, the court noted that the issue was one of first 
impression.77  Applying Maryland law,78 the court followed the reasoning 
of the Court of Special Appeals and analogized the conflicts of interest that 
arise when a director sues his corporation with those that arise when a 
corporation and one of its directors enter into a contract that involves a 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.   
 73. Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 397 Md. 37, 42–43, 915 A.2d 991, 994 (2007). 
 74. Id. at 53, 915 A.2d at 1000–01. 
 75. Id. at 54–55, 915 A.2d at 1001. 
 76. Id. at 55, 915 A.2d at 1001.   
 77. See id. at 56, 915 A.2d at 1002 (noting that there was no authority directly on point from 
Maryland or any other jurisdiction).   
 78. Following a lengthy discussion of choice of law principles, the court concluded that, 
although the “internal affairs doctrine” recognizes Delaware as the controlling authority for this 
case, the duties owed by a director to the corporate members were the same under Maryland and 
Delaware law.  Id. at 51–53, 915 A.2d at 999–1000. 
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conflicting financial interest.79  The court noted that, while this analogy was 
not perfect, it balanced Gurland’s fiduciary duties and obligations as a 
director against his conflicting personal interest in seeking $150,000 in 
severance pay from Storetrax, which was not in the corporation’s best 
interest.80 
The court also concluded that a director should receive “safe harbor” 
by disclosing all relevant conflicts of interest and all surrounding relevant 
facts, so that the remaining disinterested shareholders or directors could act 
to protect the corporation’s financial interests.81  Here, the court held that 
Gurland had sufficiently disclosed to Storetrax the imminence of his lawsuit 
such that he could claim the “safe harbor” protection.82 
Last, the court addressed whether Gurland breached his fiduciary duty 
to the corporation by seeking a writ of attachment, garnishing Storetrax’s 
bank account, and refusing to relinquish the writ of attachment.83  The court 
noted that no binding rule of law existed with respect to whether fiduciary 
duties prohibited a director from enforcing his claim against the 
corporation, and that most jurisdictions permitted a director to become a 
creditor against his own corporation, absent bad faith or fraud.84  Thus, the 
court found that once Gurland became a creditor of the corporation, “he had 
the same rights as any other creditor to enforce the judgment.”85  The court 
reiterated that Gurland received no unfair advantage in receiving and 
enforcing his default judgment because Storetrax had notice of the default 
judgment given that the parties’ lawsuit was public record.86  The Court of 
Appeals agreed with the Court of Special Appeals’ finding that Gurland had 
no fiduciary duty to notify Storetrax prior to requesting or executing a writ 
 
 79. Id. at 56, 915 A.2d at 1002. 
 80. Id. at 58–59, 915 A.2d at 1003–04. 
 81. Id. at 56–57, 915 A.2d at 1002. 
 82. Id. at 59, 915 A.2d at 1004.  Specifically, the court found that Gurland’s December 11, 
2001 letter outlining his severance pay claim put Storetrax on notice that Gurland believed the 
agreement was valid and set a “clear and reasonable” deadline for when Gurland would file suit.  
Id.  Because Storetrax’s December 20, 2001 letter to Gurland indicated that the corporation 
anticipated and was preparing for litigation, the court found no evidence that Gurland knew that 
Storetrax did not know of the breach of contract action at the time Gurland moved for summary 
judgment.  Id. at 59–60, 915 A.2d at 1004–05.  Gurland moved for summary judgment within the 
requirements set forth in Maryland Rule 2-124 and did not “act[] to conceal the pendency of the 
lawsuit” or use any insider knowledge or confidential information.  Id. at 60–61, 915 A.2d at 
1005.  Additionally, Storetrax failed to ask Gurland whether he had filed suit during his two post-
filing visits to Storetrax’s offices.  Id. at 61, 915 A.2d at 1005. 
 83. Id. at 61, 915 A.2d at 1005. 
 84. Id. (citing Beaver Park Co. v. Hobson, 283 P. 772, 775–76 (Colo. 1930)).   
 85. Id. at 62–63, 915 A.2d at 1006. 
 86. Id. at 63, 915 A.2d at 1006.  The court explained that it was reasonable for Gurland to 
assume that a copy of the judgment had been delivered to Storetrax pursuant to Maryland law.  Id.   
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of garnishment against the company,87 and held that Gurland had no 
fiduciary obligation to not enforce the default judgment against Storetrax 
merely because Storetrax asked him to.88 
IV.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
While Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland is noteworthy as a case of first 
impression in the United States, it is a far more important warning to 
private companies to exercise greater diligence in their executive 
employment decisions and selection of resident agents for service of 
process.  This case illustrates the importance of timely resolving executive 
employment termination disputes and hiring and maintaining constant 
communication with a diligent and interested resident agent.  As a result of 
Storetrax’s mistakes in terminating Gurland and hiring a negligent resident 
agent, it can fault only itself for Gurland’s judgment against the 
corporation. 
Storetrax.com is a particularly cautionary tale because the events 
leading up to litigation could have been easily avoided.  It appears that 
Gurland initially parted ways with Storetrax on amicable terms with the 
board of directors, at least in the eyes of the board.89  However, regardless 
of the terms under which Gurland was terminated, the board should have 
anticipated that Gurland would not be pleased to lose his position and 
$150,000 salary with the company he founded only four years earlier.  In 
fact, the board was on notice that Gurland expected to be paid severance 
and was prepared to seek “every possible remedy in the event of a 
dispute.”90  Gurland filed a breach of contract claim against Storetrax only 
after the parties attempted to resolve the dispute amicably.91   
First, Storetrax’s board should have operated with a heightened 
awareness of the possibility that Gurland would file suit from the time 
Gurland was fired until he failed to respond to Storetrax’s settlement offer.  
Storetrax’s board irresponsibly failed to communicate regularly with 
 
 87. Id.  The Court of Appeals distinguished the Storetrax.com facts from those in Marr and 
Union Ice, stressing that the notice given to the corporations in Marr and Union Ice did not 
amount to “a direct threat of imminent litigation,” as did Gurland’s notice to Storetrax.  Id. at 66–
67, 915 A.2d at 1008.  Gurland’s notice, unlike the notices given in Marr and Union Ice, was 
sufficiently specific to enable Storetrax to act in its best interests in preparing for Gurland’s 
impending litigation.  Id. at 67, 915 A.2d at 1008–09.   
 88. Id., 915 A.2d at 1009.   
 89. See Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 168 Md. App. 50, 61–62, 895 A.2d 355, 362 (2006).  
On November 19, 2001, the CEO wrote Gurland a letter, noting that she “look[ed] forward to 
seeing [Gurland] at the next Board meeting . . . .”  Id. at 62, 895 A.2d at 362.  Storetrax only later 
justified Gurland’s termination by citing several instances that called into question Gurland’s job 
performance.  Storetrax.com, 397 Md. at 45 n.2, 915 A.2d at 995 n.2.   
 90. Storetrax.com, 168 Md. App. at 63, 895 A.2d at 363.   
 91. Storetrax.com, 397 Md. at 45, 915 A.2d at 995–96.   
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Gurland and his counsel, particularly after making its settlement offer.92  
Moreover, on Gurland’s two visits to Storetrax’s offices after filing suit, no 
Storetrax employee or board member spoke with Gurland regarding the 
status of his severance dispute with the corporation.93 
Second, Storetrax should have taken immediate steps to mitigate the 
damage Gurland was likely to cause to the corporation.  While it may not 
have been clear to Storetrax’s board how displeased Gurland was over his 
termination and how determined he was to recover severance pay, it is now 
very clear that Storetrax should have taken greater precautions to ensure 
that the ultimate result, albeit an unusual one, would not occur.  Storetrax 
should have immediately worked with its counsel to resolve any potential 
disputes with Gurland over his termination, particularly because Gurland 
held a unique position with the company as its founder and a board 
member.  Storetrax should also have immediately removed Gurland from 
the board of directors to avoid any conflicts of interest or concerns over 
fiduciary loyalties to the corporation that may have resulted from his 
termination.  A small legal bill and reasonable severance settlement at the 
time could have saved the corporation countless hours and likely thousands 
of dollars in legal fees. 
Third, Storetrax should have retained an experienced local resident 
agent and maintained a constant line of communication with its resident 
agent.  Storetrax did not receive notice of Gurland’s lawsuit because of 
several errors made by the resident agent and an independent contractor 
hired by its resident agent to receive and forward service of process on 
behalf of the resident agent.94  At the time, Storetrax’s resident agent was 
Corporate America, one of the largest resident agent companies in the 
country,95 which may help to explain why the resident agent did not give 
Storetrax the most diligent personal attention and instead hired an 
independent contractor to handle the routine day-to-day receiving and 
forwarding of service of process.  Storetrax could have eliminated many of 
the opportunities for miscommunication that resulted in untimely notice and 
a default judgment in this case by retaining local counsel with a personal 
interest in protecting its client.  At the very least, the Storetrax.com decision 
is a wake-up call to every private company to carefully select a resident 
agent that is both meticulously well-organized and incentivized to protect 
 
 92. See id. (noting that after Gurland stated he would consider the settlement offer, the parties 
failed to correspond).    
 93. Id. at 45–46, 915 A.2d at 996; Storetrax.com, 168 Md. App. at 65, 895 A.2d at 364.   
 94. Storetrax.com, 397 Md. at 46 & n.3, 915 A.2d at 996 & n.3; see also supra note 16 and 
accompanying text.   
 95. Telephone Interview with Ronald L. Early, Senior Partner, Lerch, Early & Brewer, Chtd. 
(Aug. 11, 2008).  Corporate America was purchased in 2003 by Corporation Service Company, 
one of the “Big Four” resident agent companies.  Id. 
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its corporate client’s best interests.  Small private companies, such as 
Storetrax, may be better protected by utilizing their local counsel as resident 
agent, the counsel who organized and supported the business since 
incorporation.96 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that Joshua Gurland did not breach his fiduciary duty to Storetrax by 
filing suit against the corporation, pursuing summary judgment by default, 
or enforcing his default judgment by garnishing the corporation’s bank 
account, despite the corporation’s obvious ignorance of the lawsuit.97  The 
Court of Appeals had no mandatory authority on which to rely and very 
little persuasive authority, but nevertheless properly held that Gurland never 
breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation.98  The court’s decision 
sounds a wake-up call to directors of private companies to take caution with 
the termination of potentially disgruntled employees and to select a resident 
agent whose incentives are aligned with the corporation’s best interests.99 
 
 
 96. In this scenario, the resident agent’s and the corporation’s interests are aligned because 
the corporation is fearful of suit from third parties and the resident agent is fearful of a malpractice 
suit from the corporation, its client, for failure to deliver service of process in a timely fashion.  
Only when the two parties’ interests are aligned will the corporation and its counsel be fully 
incentivized to protect their respective best interests. 
 97. See supra Part III. 
 98. See supra Part III. 
 99. See supra Part IV. 
